



Draft 3
3 July 2018

Summer School
REBUILDING SYRIA FROM WITHIN

CONCEPT NOTE


Guimarães, Portugal

18 JULY – 27 JULY 2018

Co-organized by the Global Platform for Syrian Students, the University of Minho (Portugal) and IUAV University (Italy), with the support of ESCWA-NAFS



Universidade do Minho
Escola de Arquitectura



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1. Preliminary Remarks

The idea of organizing a Summer School for and with our Syrian students on “Rebuilding Syria from Within” came up as a very natural next step in the emergency scholarship program that has been run by the Global Platform for Syrian Students (GP4SYS) since 2014. This emergency scholarship program is underpinned by the pressing need to provide young Syrian people affected by war not only with quality higher education opportunities but also with some kind of broader framework that will allow them to think of the future of war-torn Syria and their own, as the next generation and as leaders of the future.

The GP4SYS hopes that this 2018 Summer School will be the beginning of a new cycle of initiatives aimed at averting the loss of an entire generation by engaging talented young people in projects anchored in the future, strengthening social cohesion among young Syrians – regardless of where they are or of the diversity of their affiliations -, investing in peace building efforts and restoring hope for the future.

The 2018 Summer School - which the University of Minho (Portugal) kindly accepted to host as well as being a co-organizer jointly with the GP4SYS and IUAV University (Italy) - owes a lot to talks held in Beirut with the UN Economic and Social Commission-National Agenda For Syria (ESCAW-NAFS) and to the strong support received by its team. As in all activities developed by the GP4SYS, this Summer School is driven by the goal of achieving close cooperation with international organizations and partners in order to develop synergies, enhance collaborative coordinated actions and create multiplier effects.

The Summer School on “Rebuilding Syria from Within” will bring together, over a ten-day period, young Syrian architects, engineers and urban planners as well as any other colleagues around the world with a keen interest in knowing more about Syria or with specific experience in rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction.

In a way, this Summer School stands as a pilot that will help the GP4SYS to charter a new cycle of workshops, seminars and encounters that will focus on a wide array of issues ranging from “reconstruction and economic recovery” to “reconciliation and social cohesion” and “governance, institutions building & democratization”, also including some cross-cutting sectors.

By and large, we will use the inspiring paper on “The Strategic Policy Alternatives Framework (SPAF) – Syria Post-Conflict“, produced by NAFS (The National Agenda for the Future of Syria), to frame and shape this set of new initiatives that will be kicked off with the 2018 Summer School on “Rebuilding Syria From Within”.

In designing these activities, we will fully endorse the guiding principles underpinning the NAFS approach, i.e. “Syrian ownership”, “inclusion as the basis of participation”, “free, normative and objective dialogue as the basis of the work”. As the promoter of these dialogue and cooperation opportunities, the GP4SYS will act as a mere convener and a facilitator, preserving its status as a humanitarian actor. It goes without saying that all conversations within this framework will be held under the Chatham House rule.

In setting up the 2018 Summer School, we are extremely grateful to the ESCAW team that works on the NAFS for its thoughtful support for our activities. We are also extremely grateful to the University of Minho, in particular to the School of Architecture, for co-organizing this event and receiving us, and to the IUAV University of Venice for its willingness to embark on this journey.

2. The 2018 Summer School on Rebuilding Syria from Within – vision

Stefen Heydemann (Rules for reconstruction of Syria, Steven, Brookings, August 24, 2017) underscores the importance of setting up principles and priorities to guide early recovery and post-conflict reconstruction. Against this backdrop he notes that “not surprisingly, where these are designed to mitigate the grievances and governance failures that caused mass violence, prospects for recurrence go down. Where they are likely to amplify pre-war grievances and failures, prospects for recurrence are much higher (...). Post-conflict reconstruction that does not address critical questions of institutional legitimacy and capacity, or provide for citizen security, justice, and political inclusion, is unlikely to be stable”.

The 2018 Summer School on “Rebuilding Syria from Within” aims at achieving four main goals:

- 1) providing participants with some background information on the most significant cultural, social, economic and governance-related


internal structural factors (root causes) which contributed to the making of the conflict;

- 2) guiding participants in looking at and assessing the most significant cultural, social, economic and governance-related impacts of the conflict as a pre-requisite for identifying policy deficits, developing policy alternatives for future reconstruction plans;
- 3) providing participants with the opportunity to focus in detail on a number of Syrian cities and develop elements of a personal vision for these cities, just as they would tackle an in-house architectural work focused on a rebuilding project.
- 4) launching a platform/network of mentoring partnerships that will stand as a hub for university and industry collaborations on this topic

What Comes After Peace

After five years of an extremely violent conflict, any attempt at reconstruction will have to address the factors that led to the conflict and its persistence. As in most of the MENA region, the state-led economic model followed by Syrian regimes contributed to poverty reduction and equity overall (Devarajan and Mottaghi, 2015a). However, the sustained pre-crisis economic growth did not translate evenly across Syria's regions, nor did it translate into higher citizen satisfaction (On the eve of the Arab Spring, average life satisfaction was particularly low in Syria (Ianchovichina et al., 2015).

An analysis of the 2006 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (UNICEF MICS) highlights substantial disparities among Syria's governorates. The sample consisted of 20,000 households across the country; the dataset gives information on the assets of each household. The assets support different household domains, such as chores, transportation, communication, and basic services. The constructed asset-based index reflects both household levels of disposable income and access to public services, such as water, electricity, or telecom infrastructure. Figure below reports, for each governorate, the percentage of the population belonging to the poorest quintile of the country.



Poverty and Remoteness (source: Unicef's 2006 MICS) - In Syria, Reconstruction for Peace

The poorest people were concentrated in the northern governorates of Hassaka and Raqqa, while Syrians living in Lattakia and Sweida belonged mostly to the top quintiles. This echoes the reported increasing contribution of spatial inequality to expenditure inequality in Syria (Hassine, 2015). Despite the overall increase in average incomes, governorates in Northern Syria lagged behind.

The country's pre-crisis health system had significant variations in health status and an inequitable distribution of resources (...). It was characterized by skewed health outcomes, limited financial protection, and a lack of needed infrastructure (World Bank, 2015). By 2010, Syria had achieved significant progress in improving the health status of the population. However regional variation persisted, with governorates such as Daraa and Hama having worse health outcomes, and disparities in vaccination coverage compared to 60 percent coverage in Aleppo and 90 percent in Latakia (PAPFAM, 2009). There was also large variation in health infrastructure, physician density and bed capacity across the selected governorates (CBSSYR, 2011).

The role of grievances as a source of conflict is well documented (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004), and rebuilding the dissatisfaction that led to the war in the first place can have devastating effects. In neighboring Iraq, the failure to provide justice, security, health care and coverage of basic needs are thought to have alienated a large section of the population, in spite of a great amount of funds allocated to rebuilding the country (Smith, 2013; Strasser, 2016). The failure to deliver landmark reconstruction projects, despite 60 billion dollars spent (Londono, 2013), have contributed to the atmosphere of mistrust. Contracting abuses and mismanagement in expensive projects, with little ownership, have created a channel for corruption and amplified regional tensions. The lack of inclusive governance and the perceived exclusion of Sunni Muslims have been alleged to severely intensify sectarian tensions and increased support for armed groups (Strasser, 2016; Healy & Gordon, 2011).

In sum, the reconstruction of Syria cannot be solely driven by infrastructure projects; it has to deliver inclusive institutions that are necessary for rebuilding trust and mitigating the social tensions. For instance, Whitt (2010) finds strong links between ethnic trust and trust in institutions, suggesting that they are vital for promoting reconciliation. Rebuilding a stable Syria also means understanding the underlying causes of civil war. The violence and persistence of conflict have to be taken into account and reflected in the post-war reconstruction. Abdel Jelil and Do (2015) illustrate how the regime had a stronghold in places it favored, such as Tartous and Lattakia, but ignored the more remote areas such as Deir Ezzour, Raqqa and parts of Hassake that quickly fell under rebel and then Daesh control. These remote areas are Syria's oil producing regions, and while contributing to the central government's budget, were left behind. Similar situations, as recent as the conflict in the Niger delta or the case of South Sudan, have been fueling political instability. Inclusion in post-war Syria thus needs to be not just ethnic and religious, but also geographic.

Conclusion

As the country enters its sixth year of civil war, the conflict that has claimed between 132,000 and 470,000 lives, pushed half of the Syrian population out of their homes, and destroyed \$70-80 billion in capital stock by mid-2014, needs to come to an end. Development organizations have a role to play in alleviating the suffering of the Syrian population both inside and outside Syria. They have the scope to champion a comprehensive and inclusive reconstruction plan that will not only foster peace today but also sustain peace tomorrow.

Syrian, Reconstruction for Peace, World Bank Group, 2016

3. The 2018 Summer School – Rebuilding Syria from Within – approach and methodology

The program of the 2018 Summer School will be prepared and conducted taking into account the following principles:

- the experience and area of knowledge of the participants are valued and placed at the center of the process;
- intercultural learning and non-formal education approaches (learner-centeredness, practical learning, dialogical learning and involvement of the learners in the process) are as important as formal learning situations;
- mentoring will play a key role in enhancing technical and practical skills of participants;
- addressing all issues that are of relevance, also taking into account what participants can do about them;
- providing an optimum balance between plenary inputs and small group learning and practical workshops;
- providing field-visit opportunities, namely to Braga and Porto;

- providing intercultural opportunities for participants to meet and mingle as well as to interact and connect with local communities in Guimarães.

Resource persons, experts and guest speakers from diverse scientific areas will be invited for specific functions, themes or inputs in order to enrich the program and provide participants with an opportunity to consolidate and enlarge their academic background, meet inspiring leaders, exchange ideas, participate in dynamic conversations.

Some of the questions that they might want to ask are: what is identity and how can an architecture provide identity? What does it mean for an architect to achieve identity with the place where they are building? How is one's identity to be rebuilt after massive destruction provoked by a war such as in Syria? On what grounds was it standing and can it be re-established? What role has architecture to play in all this?

Furthermore, over the Summer School all participants will be involved in concrete projects to be developed in 10 studio workshops. Complementarily, participants in the Summer School will also have the opportunity to do some field visits and enlarge their experience and knowledge.

4. The 2018 Summer School – Rebuilding Syria from Within – program

The program of the Summer School will combine:

Lectures/debates

Bringing all participants together, in these sessions participants will hear from special guests – experts or prominent leaders. These conversations are designed to highlight some key topics on “rebuilding Syria” related issues and approaches to global challenges.

Small Group Discussions

In these in-depth conversations, participants will leverage shared lessons and challenges on a number of key issues. They will also focus on specific topics of interest by using alternate lenses and identifying potential areas of collaboration.

Studio Workshops

Each Studio Workshop will be led by a team made up of a guest architect and two highly-skilled tutors, one of whom at least must be Syrian, and will include up to ten participants. The studio workshops are designed following four main ideas that articulate the program: sharing (shared creativity fostering the capacity for dialogue); experience (understanding derived from observation, conceptual and critical thinking, participation and experience); transversality (an integrative interdisciplinary approach); project (focused on Syria – on one damaged area/city/object). Participants in each studio will be divided in two groups focusing on different, although related scales, from territorial/urban scale to building design.

Issues such as war debris, public spaces and collective infrastructures, integration of vegetation into the built environment, housing, health and education facilities as well as urban mobility will receive special attention.

Studio breakout sessions

Studio breakout sessions will drill down into the studio's work on a daily basis in order to allow all participants to share and pass on a number of cross-sectoral perspectives, observations and synergies for mutual enrichment.

Special events

The opening and the closing of the Summer School will feature prominent guest speakers. The opening will include a major key-note speaker whereas at the closing session the accomplishments of the Summer School will be highlighted and a high level panel of prominent speakers will address priorities for future action. The closing session will also include a visit to an exhibition that will feature final outputs of the Summer School, such as drawings, photos, models, videos, etc. The program also includes two field visits.

Cultural events

The program of the Summer School will include several cultural events such as a Photo Contest “*Building Resilience for Everyday Life – Focus on Syrians*” and a Photo Exhibition, a movie night and a Syrian dinner. These cultural events aim at creating the right ecosystem that will allow participants to enhance their sense of belonging to a community and to pass on an attitude to life, architecture and creativity; at the same time, these cultural events will be an opportunity for to the host community of Guimarães to communicate with participants and get a better understanding of Syrian culture and current predicaments.

5. The 2018 Summer School – schedule

A tentative schedule of the Summer School is attached to this Note as an Annex.

6. The 2018 Summer School – Rebuilding Syria from Within – a backgrounder

This session aims at providing some key general information on the impact of the Syrian conflict as of early 2017 by focusing on its effect on the country’s population, economy and institutions in addition to the damage to infrastructure. Most of the information presented here is collected from available Reports¹

Syria Before the Conflict

On the eve of the 2011 unrest, Syria was a fast-growing, lower-middle-income country.

In aggregate terms, the Syrian economy was improving, albeit starting from an unfavorable base, during the 2000s. Gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an average of 4.3 percent per year from 2000 to 2010 in real terms, which was almost entirely driven by growth in non-oil sectors, and inflation averaged at a reasonable 4.9 percent.

The strong growth performance, however, did not translate into broad-based economic and political inclusion and further transparency and civil liberties.

¹ Most of the information reported in this session is a résumé of the Report on “The Toll of War: Economic and Social Impact Analysis (ESIA9 of the Conflict in Syria, produced by the World Bank Group, 2017

Syria was comparable to other regional economies in many socioeconomic indicators in 2010. The multidimensional poverty rate (5.5 percent) and income inequality (Gini index: 32.7) stood close to regional averages. However, the labor force participation (LFP) rate in Syria (43.5 percent) was one of the lowest in the world, low even by regional standards (the Arab Republic of Egypt and Tunisia had 49 and 47 percent LFP, respectively). This was primarily driven by the extremely low, and decreasing, role of women in the economy (LFP about 5 percentage point lower than the average for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), which is already low by global standards, and female unemployment, at 25.2 percent, the highest in the region). Similarly, the country consistently performed unfavorably in governance and civil liberties–related indicators during the 2000s. Syria’s ratings on measures of freedom of association and assembly, and freedom of expression and belief, were low even compared with other countries in MENA.

Another important feature of Syria’s governance landscape prior to 2011 was the country’s high levels of perceived corruption and low trust in public institutions.

According to global indexes, Syria’s rankings on control of corruption and control of economic monopolies declined after 2005. Although the country had already trailed the middle-income MENA peers, like Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia, on both fronts in 2005, the gap widened substantially by 2010. These trends also undermined citizen trust in public institutions. Gallup surveys from 2009–10 show that the percentage of Syrians expressing trust in key public institutions, such as local police and the judicial system, was lower than comparators. For instance, in 2010, only 48 percent of Syrians reported trust in local police; in comparison, about 87 percent of Jordanians responded favorably.

Added to these enabling conditions were external factors that contributed to the onset of the conflict.

The Arab Spring and a sudden shift in the regional context, where armed rebellions became easier, as well as the actions chosen by various parties, led to a quick escalation of the initial protests, from civil unrest to a long and intense armed conflict. Fueled by a “loser loses all” logic, which prevented a reasonable and compromising resolution, the conflict has persisted and intensified over time, leading to devastation for all.

It is important to underline that starting in March 2011, when the peaceful protests in Deraa took place and later spread massively all over Syria up to the present moment, following years of a war that has become a war by proxy as well as being an internal intra-Syrian war, great parts of the country were destroyed. This has had immense and profound social consequences to such an extent that one can wonder what remains from the refined social fabric of what used to be the Syrian nation.

One interesting point to be noted is that “the peaceful demonstrators at the beginning of the Syrian Revolution in 2011 stressed that all Syrians were one and united. One of the slogans was that they were all Syrians, rather than members of religious groups like Alawis, Druzes, Isma’ilis, Sunnis or Kurds; and that they were all “one”. This was the sincere wish, expressed by the demonstrators. But events took a different turn, and (...) the Syrian War moved in the direction of a sectarian-tinted conflict that most Syrians did not want, but nevertheless became a reality, as a result of dynamics in Syrian society” (Nikolaos Van Dam , Destroying a Nation – the civil war in

Syria”). In Syria, geography, national identity, population groups, minorities and sectarianism are all interconnected issues. And even if “the Syrian mosaic compared favorably with the situation in various other Middle Eastern countries and had more often than not a peaceful character” (idem) before the war, seven years of a bloody conflict that led to huge movements of forced displacements and influxes of rural people into the greater cities and vice-versa have destroyed the traditional fabric of Syrian society, creating new dynamics that are still in the making and that in any case might not easily be fully understood. Yet, these are key issues when it comes to discussing recovery and rebuilding issues and to developing an appropriate understanding of the “human territory” where the future work of architects is rooted...

The Wrath of Conflict

Overall picture

The conflict has inflicted significant damage to the Syrian Arab Republic’s physical capital stock (7 percent housing stock destroyed and 20 percent partially damaged), led to large numbers of casualties and forced displacement (between 400,000 and 470,000 estimated deaths and more than half of Syria’s 2010 population forcibly displaced), while depressing and disrupting economic activity. From 2011 until the end of 2016, the cumulative losses in gross domestic product (GDP) have been estimated at \$226 billion, about four times the Syrian GDP in 2010.

The conflict has inflicted extensive damage on Syria’s physical infrastructure.

Cities like Homs, Aleppo, and Damascus, and many smaller towns, have served as battlegrounds for government and rebel offensives, with tragic consequences for their inhabitants. Over time, the conflict has caused the partial or full breakdown of urban systems in many cities by destroying houses and public service-related infrastructure like roads, schools, and hospitals, while leading to economic collapse in many areas. As bridges, water resources, grain silos, and other economically significant assets became strategic targets, the physical damage ratios increased. Across the 10 cities on which this study focuses, 27 percent of the housing stock has been impacted, with 7 percent destroyed and 20 percent partially damaged. The percentage varies across cities, with the highest full destruction occurring in Dayr az-Zawr (10 percent) and the highest partial damage in Tadmur (also called Palmyra, 32.8 percent).

With 8 percent destroyed housing units and 23 percent partially damaged, Aleppo is also among the worst impacted cities. Across the eight governorates, about 8 percent of the housing stock has been destroyed and 23 percent partially damaged. The damage has been particularly high in the health sector, as medical facilities were specifically targeted. Estimates show that about half of all medical facilities in the eight governorates studied in this report have been partially damaged, and about 16 percent of them were destroyed. The results are similar in education sector facilities (53 percent partially damaged, and 10 percent destroyed).

Disruptions in economic networks, human capital, and connectivity have greatly magnified the effects of physical damage on public service delivery.

Physical damage reflects only a subset of the effects the conflict has imposed on public service delivery in Syria. The available evidence suggests that physical damage to the electricity infrastructure has been severe, but not devastating: all the country’s hydroelectric dams and

six of 18 power plants remain operational, while four more power plants are partially damaged, and one has been destroyed. However, fuel shortages and conflict-driven constraints to operation and maintenance have led to a sharp drop in public power supply. Power generation declined to 16,208 gigawatt-hours (GWh) in 2015, compared with 43,164 GWh in 2010, a drop of 62.5 percent. Much of this decline appears to be due to fuel shortages, as available generation capacity declined by about 30 percent in the same period. The decline in electricity supply has caused major disruptions. The majority of cities receive only a few hours of electricity a day. The government has applied a rationing policy via load shedding throughout the country, which affects the delivery of other services, like water, education, and health care services.

Among all the consequences of the conflict, the effects on human lives and demographic displacement have been the most dramatic.

The pre-conflict population of Syria was estimated at 20.7 million in 2010 (World Development Indicators). Since 2011, the conflict has created a complex set of pressures on the country's population. The most recent calculations by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) put the population within Syria at 18.8 million as of November 2016. Data limitations render a precise and comprehensive decomposition of the demographic changes impossible: conflict affects fertility rates and life expectancy alike. In addition, an important portion of demographic movements takes place informally: some refugees remain unregistered and, in certain cases, migrants do not factor into in-country population or refugee totals. The casualties that are directly related to conflict are estimated between 400,000 (UN, as of April 2016) and 470,000 (Syrian Center for Policy Research, as of February 2016).

Syria has become the largest forced displacement crisis in the world since World War II. Over half of the country's pre-conflict population has been forcibly displaced.

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the total number of Syrians presently registered as refugees outside the country in Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and North Africa is 4.9 million. In addition, more than 800,000 Syrian nationals are estimated to have sought asylum in Europe in 2015 and 2016. Many of these individuals have moved more than once, and have not been removed from registration lists in their first country of refuge. These numbers also do not include an estimated 0.4 million to 1.1 million unregistered Syrian refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Iraq. The number of internally displaced persons was at 5.7 million as of January 2017, with 56 percent of them remaining within their own governorates. Although those who moved within their governorate may be more likely to return to their original communities, the return migration so far has been small (0.56 million) compared with the total numbers of displaced.

The losses in GDP between 2011 and 2016 sum to about four times the size of the Syrian GDP in 2010.

The destruction of physical capital, casualties, forced displacement, and breakup of economic networks has had devastating consequences for Syrian economic activity. Syria's GDP was estimated to have contracted by 61 percent between 2011 and 2015 in real terms, and by an additional 2 percent in 2016—a 63 percent decline compared with its 2010 GDP. Estimates of national account indicators, including counterfactual GDP numbers estimated by using statistical estimation methods, show that the actual GDP fell \$51 billion (in 2010 prices) short of the counterfactual GDP in 2016. Aggregating these differences between counterfactual and actual GDP numbers between 2011 and 2016 shows that the cumulative loss in GDP amounts to \$226 billion in 2010 prices, about four times the 2010 GDP.

Economic disruption has been particularly devastating in the hydrocarbons sector.

The oil GDP declined by 93 percent during the same period, while the non-oil economy contracted by 52 percent due to the severe destruction of infrastructure, reduced access to fuel and electricity, low business confidence, and disruption of trade. Hydrocarbon production plunged from 383,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 2010 to 10,000 bpd in 2015 and 2016, due to Islamic State control over most of the oil-producing areas.⁴ Agricultural production also

registered significant losses as a result of damage to irrigation systems and shortages of labor and inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, and fuel. The most severe contraction of the economy took place in 2012 and 2013, when economic activity shrank by 29 and 32 percent, respectively, as fighting intensified and spread across the country.

The Syrian economy suffers from severe twin deficits, depleted foreign exchange reserves, and an unsustainably high public debt.

Conflict-related disruptions and international sanctions reduced Syrian exports by 92 percent between 2011 and 2015. The current account deficit was estimated to have reached 28 percent of GDP in 2016, up from 0.7 percent of GDP in 2010. The gap has increasingly been financed by withdrawing foreign exchange reserves, which declined severely, from nearly US\$21 billion in 2010 to less than US\$1 billion in 2015. Fiscal revenues dropped from 23 percent of GDP in 2010 to less than 3 percent of GDP in 2015. This was mainly due to losses in oil and tax revenues, the collapse of international trade due to sanctions, a growing informal economy, and weak administrative collection capacity. In response to this shortfall, government spending was cut back (especially capital expenditures), but these measures were not enough to offset the fall in revenues. As a result, gross public debt rose from 30 percent of GDP in 2010 to a staggering 150 percent of GDP in 2015.

Rapidly shrinking job opportunities and scaled down social security programs have further aggravated a mounting humanitarian crisis.


Since the onset of the conflict, jobs were destroyed at an estimated rate of approximately 538,000 per year on average between 2010 and 2015, adding 482,000 people to the unemployment pool every year. More than three in four Syrians of working age (7.7 percent, or nine million individuals) are not involved in any economic value generation: 2.9 million of them are unemployed and 6.1 million are inactive. Unemployment among youth reached 78 percent in 2015. Facing a mounting fiscal problem, the Syrian Government dramatically decreased subsidies. Prices of fuel oil increased 10-fold from 2011 to 2015. As for rice and sugar, prices increased 2.3-fold in the same period. Estimates for this report suggest that approximately six in 10 Syrians live in extreme poverty today. As of December 2016, 5.8 million individuals received in-kind food assistance. The World Food Programme alone distributes more than four million food baskets (supplements for about 1,700 kilocalories per day) each month.

The longer the conflict continues, the more difficult the post-conflict recovery will be.

Although the rate of deterioration moderates over the course of the conflict, the effects become more persistent. Should the conflict end in its sixth year (baseline), GDP recoups about 41 percent of the gap with its pre-conflict level within the next four years. Overall, the cumulative GDP losses will reach 7.6 times the 2010 GDP by the 20th year. In comparison, GDP recoups only 28 percent of the gap in four years if the conflict ends in its 10th year (alternative scenario), and cumulative losses will be at 13.2 times the 2010 GDP. Simulations also show that outmigration could double between the sixth year of the conflict and the 20th year, in the case of a continued conflict. These results do not capture many other complications, like political economy challenges such as conflict-driven grievances. Adding these factors would only reinforce the main findings of the report: the longer the conflict persists, the deeper the grievances and divisions will run in the Syrian society, rendering it very difficult to build efficient institutions and effective economic mechanisms.

7. The 2018 Summer School - STUDIO WORKSHOPS



Up to ten studio workshops will be organized during the 2018 Summer School. These studios might focus on a number of buildings/cities/areas chosen among the following:




The ten cities above were selected on the basis of several criteria, including conflict intensity, geographical representation and being an important source or destination of IDP (internally displaced persons).

Some General Data on SYRIA DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

Governorate-level Estimates of Housing Damage




Dar'a




- Partially Damage Apartment Units
- Destroyed Apartment Units
- Partially Damage Other Types
- Destroyed Other Types
- No damage to Housing

Rif Dimashq




- Partially Damage Apartment Units
- Destroyed Apartment Units
- Partially Damage Other Types
- Destroyed Other Types
- No damage to Housing

Idlib




- Partially Damage Apartment Units
- Destroyed Apartment Units
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Aleppo




- Partially Damage Apartment Units
- Destroyed Apartment Units
- Partially Damage Other Types
- Destroyed Other Types
- No damage to Housing

Raqqa



- Partially Damage Apartment Units
- Destroyed Apartment Units
- Partially Damage Other Types
- Destroyed Other Types
- No damage to Housing

Dayr Az-Zawr



- Partially Damage Apartment Units
- Destroyed Apartment Units
- Partially Damage Other Types
- Destroyed Other Types
- No damage to Housing

Housing Damage in Cities

City	Units in 2010	Damaged Units in 2017		Damaged units in 2017 %	
		Partial damage	Destroyed	Partial damage	Destroyed
Aleppo	662.323	154.465	49.830	23,30%	7,50%
Raqqa	55.746	7.214	2.418	12,90%	4,30%
Dar'a	30.532	3.678	922	12%	3%
Douma	18.786	3.476	884	18,50%	4,70%
Dayr az-Zawr	48.430	15.107	4.849	31,20%	10%
Homs	216.191	37.350	12.526	17,30%	5,80%
Hama	101.902	2.531	3.020	2,50%	3,00%
Idlib	46.014	1.164	2.916	25,30%	6,30%
Tadmur	3.178	1.042	272	32,80%	8,60%
Kobani	20.801	2.226	814	10,70%	3,90%
Total	1.181.813	238.311	78.339	19,80%	6,50%

Housing Damage Estimates across Governorates

Governorate	Units in 2010	Damage Unites in 2017		Damage Units in 2017 (%)	
		Partial Damage	Destroyed	Partial Damage	Destroyed
Aleppo	889.884	236.947	68.743	23,3%	75,0%
Raqqa	145.374	27.054	8.899	12,9%	43,0%
Dar'a	157.430	44.081	12.596	12,0%	30,0%
Rif Dismashq	600.955	103.794	40.259	18,5%	47,0%
Dayr az-Zawr	171.679	48.070	13.734	31,2%	10,0%
Homs	356.577	97.936	28.144	17,3%	58,0%
Hama	305.518	18.402	27.547	25,0%	30,0%
Idlib	261.302	73.165	20.904	25,3%	63,0%
Total	2.888.719	649.449	220.826	22,8%	86,0%

Damage in Water & Sanitation Infrastructures (8 Governorates)

Asset type	Baseline Coverage	Destroyed	Partially Damaged	Total Damaged	% of assets with damage
Well	234	3	29	32	14%
Water tower / Tank	176	18	34	52	30%
Water Treatment Plant	8	0	5	5	63%
Sewage Treatment Plant	4	0	1	1	25%
Dam	6	0	0	0	0%
Other Drainage Str.	3	1	1	2	67%
Pumping Station	21	0	12	12	57%
Storage Reservoir	2	0	0	0	0%
Water /Sanitation Office	3	2	1	3	100%

HIGHLIGHTS ON CITIES THAT MIGHT BE COVERED BY STUDIO WORKSHOPS

ALEPPO	
Exposure to conflict	Aleppo city+district experienced the highest level of conflict incidence in all categories (heavy artillery shelling /extensive low-intensity conflict)
Total damage	58,10%
Geographical representation	Aleppo is a microcosm of Syria's conflict. In addition to present ethno-sectarian and urban-rural dynamics, Aleppo is Syria's industrial capital, its most populous city and its most diverse. Before the conflict, Aleppo produced approximately 35% of Syrian manufactured goods, and accounted for 35% of the country's non-oil exports. This city of approximately 2.5 million reflects Syria's heterogeneity: in addition to having the second-largest Christian community in the Middle East, the city's minority groups include Kurds, Alawites, Circassians, Turkmen, Yezidi and Ismaili. The city is only 55km from the Turkish border, making it an important entry point for humanitarian assistance, foreign fighters and smuggled weapons alike.
Source/Destination IDPs	Exodus of residents from eastern Aleppo; 89% internal displacement intra-Governorate of Aleppo From Aleppo: 1.792.581 fled inside Syria; 1.632.838 fled outside Syria Returns: 332.000
Roots conflict	See notably Mapping the Conflict in Aleppo-Syria
Other Points	Debris Debris accumulation: 14,9 million tons
	Housing damage Damaged units:154.465 Destroyed:49.830 Damaged units (%):23.3 Destroyed :7.5%
	Water and sanitation infrastructure More than 300 old and new wells provided much needed water supplies + public water trucks. Shortages and poor quality of water
	Power Infrastructure No damage: 89.39 Partial function: 99.00 But Aleppo Governorate Thermal power Station totally destroyed Alternative electricity supply – car batteries: 60,7%

	Transportation Infrastructure	Intracity roads - damaged:1,5 (Km- thousand) The most impacted city
	Health care facilities	14 hospitals and 57 medical centers destroyed (35%) Health facilities completely destroyed: 35% Health facilities partially destroyed: 28%
	Education facilities	49 education facilities destroyed (highest occurrence of damage)
	Economic Activity	Major manufacturing hub suffered major damage Industrial area damage: 73%

References

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- Mapping the Conflict in Aleppo-Syria – Caerus, 2014
- WAVE 2017:
 - o Armando Dal Fabbro, Aleppo, traces of future
 - o Paredes Pedrosa, War Heritage vs Raw Heritage?
- Aleppo
 - o Patrizia Montini Zimolo, Learning from Aleppo
 - o Fernanda de Maio, Out of Focus. The Aleppo’s scar
 - o UNLAB, How can we turn Aleppo’s conflicting narratives into strategies to build the common
 - o Gaeta Springall Architects, The Red Line of Aleppo

DAR'A		
Exposure to conflict	Situation is currently evolving; until 2017: extensive low intensity conflict (relative prevalence); extensive heavy artillery shelling (relative intensity)	
Total Damage	2,37%	
Geographical representation	<p>“Dar`a Province is the gateway to Damascus. The battle for Damascus starts from here”, a military chief once stated. Predominately populated by Sunni Arab tribes, the province is approximately 60 miles from the capital and is located in southern Syria. It borders the country of Jordan, Syria’s Golan Heights-bordering region of al-Quneitra, and is the major land route from points south to Damascus.¹ Dar`a is widely believed to be one of the most successful areas of operation for the armed opposition, particularly the Free Syrian Army (FSA), and an important conduit of foreign military support for the rebel fighters via Jordan (N. Heros)</p>	
Source/Destination IDPs	78% internal displacement intra-Governorate of Dar’a From Dar’a : around 200.00 fled inside Syria, 174.805 fled outside Syria	
Roots conflict	<p>The city of Daraa played an important role in the start of the 2011 uprising against the government led by President Bashar al-Assad as part of the Arab Spring protests. In 2015 the “Southern Syria Offensive” took place. In early June 2017, much of the town of Daraa was reported to have been destroyed by protracted fighting. According to recent news, “Syria's army has launched an assault on rebel-held areas of the divided city of Deraa, after making significant gains elsewhere in the country's south-west. State media said troops had stepped up their bombardment ahead of an operation to take the road linking Deraa with the nearby Jordanian border. Earlier, they cut in half a strip of rebel-held territory running north from the city by capturing two key towns. Some 45,000 people have been displaced by the fighting in the past week. The south-west has been relatively calm since last July because of a "de-escalation" agreement brokered by the US and Jordan, which support the opposition, and Russia, a key ally of the government. On Tuesday morning (26 June 2018), Syria's state news agency Sana reported that the army and allied militias had seized the towns of Busra al-Hariri and Malihat al-Atash, about 30km (19 miles) north-east of Deraa” (BBC News)</p>	
Other Points	Debris	
	Housing damage	Damaged units: 3.678 Destroyed: 922 Damaged units (%): 12% Destroyed 3 %
	Water and sanitation infrastructure	

	Power Infrastructure	No damage: Partial function:
	Transportation Infrastructure	
	Health care facilities	Health facilities partially destroyed: 69%
	Education facilities	21 education facilities destroyed
	<i>Economic Activities</i>	Industrial area damage: 8%

References

- N. Heros, A profile of Syria's strategic Dar'a Province, CTC Sentinel, June 2014
- Wave 2017
 - o Aldo Aymonino, Darayya; public space and identity
 - o Beals Lyon Arquitectos, Darayya, city of Edens

DOUMA	
Exposure to conflict	<p>During the Syrian Civil War, Douma has been a major flashpoint and witnessed numerous demonstrations against the Syrian government and armed clashes against the Syrian Army and security forces during the early stages of the conflict. On 30 January 2012, the Syrian Army gained control of the city after the Battle of Douma, a major operation against the opposition armed groups in Rif Dimashq Governorate.¹ On 29 June 2012, the Syrian Army was accused of committing a massacre in Douma, where more than 50 people were killed. As of 18 October 2012, the Free Syrian Army was in control of most of the suburb. Fighting and bombardments continued in the town. Douma is the main city of the Siege of Eastern Ghouta, begun in April 2013, isolating 400,000 people in a 100 square kilometer area. UN and Red Cross aid convoys were able to reach Douma with food and supplies once in 2018. In the 2015 Douma market massacre, the city was attacked by Syrian Army ground-to-ground missiles, leaving at least 50 dead and several more missing. In early 2018, the main rebel faction based in the city was Saudi Arabian-backed Jaysh al-Islam (Army of Islam), with an estimated 10-15,000 fighters in the region. On 7 April 2018, a suspected chemical attack was carried out in the city, attributed to Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, by many Western nations including the United States and the United Kingdom.^[12] On 14 April 2018, the Syrian government forces entered the city after the evacuation deal saw rebels go to the Turkish-controlled northern Syria.</p>
Geographical representation	<p>Douma is a city in Syria. Its center is about 10 km (6 mi) northeast of the center of Damascus. Being the center of Rif Dimashq governorate (which completely surrounds the Damascus Governorate), the town is also the administrative center of Douma District. Douma is a major city of the region known as Ghouta, for the peri-urban settlements to the east and south of Damascus</p>
Source/Destination IDPs	
Roots conflict	<p>Ghouta has been under continual siege for the past five years. However, the siege entered into an advanced and critical phase after the regime took control of the neighborhoods of Qaboun and Barzeh in May 2017. These neighborhoods contained tunnels for smuggling food and resources into Ghouta. As a result of the closure of these routes, resources had to start coming into the city via the regime-controlled Al-Wafideen crossing north of Douma. Guards at this crossing consistently prevent UN assistance from entering the city. The situation is made worse by</p>

	smuggling networks and war profiteers, who have increased the prices of scarce food products to levels unaffordable for most civilians. Thus, the pressure exerted by the siege has become more intense during the latest campaign, which has destroyed daily necessities and threatened communication and movement between different neighborhoods. Ghouta has faced these repeated attacks because of its strategic and symbolic importance. It means different things to different sides in the conflict, but to all of them, control of it is imperative.	
Other Points	Debris	
	Housing damage	Damaged units: 3.476 Destroyed: 886 Damaged units: 18,% Destroyed :4.7%
	Water and sanitation infrastructure	
	Power Infrastructure	No damage: 88.24 Partial function: 64.71 No function: 11.76
	Transportation Infrastructure	
	Health care facilities	Health facilities partially destroyed: 100%
	Education facilities	5 or fewer education facilities fully damaged
	Economic Activities	Industrial area damage: 3%

References

- Ahmad Abazeid, Ghouta's Political and Military Importance Has Led to Tragedy, March 2018, Chatham House
- WAVE 2017
 - o Antonella Gallo, Douma, the echelons of Douma

DAYR AZ-ZAWR		
Exposure to conflict	Mostly exposed to extensive airstrikes and heavily artillery shelling	
Geographical representation	<p>Deir ez-Zor is the largest city in eastern Syria and the seventh largest in the country. Located 450 km (280 mi) to the northeast of the capital Damascus on the shores of the Euphrates River, Deir ez-Zor is the capital of the Deir ez-Zor Governorate</p> <p>Many Deir Ezzor residents feel that the struggle over their province stems from the importance of its natural resources</p>	
Source/Destination IDPs	From Deir-ez-Zor: 328.308 fled inside Syria and 189.987 fled outside Syria	
Roots conflict	<p>During the Syrian civil war, armed military clashes erupted in the city between the Syrian Armed Forces and the Free Syrian Army (associated with the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces) and other opposition organizations such as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and Jabhat Al-Nusra. On 21 September 2014, the Armenian memorial complex was blown up by militants of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, who had formerly been part of al-Nusra Front. Deir Ez Zor district for more than two years remained one of the few Syrian Government's strongholds in eastern Syria. In May 2015, Islamic State militants launched an offensive, capturing Palmyra and cutting off the remaining supply line to Deir ez-Zor.^[12] The city was then effectively under siege by ISIS, leaving supplies to be solely delivered by transport helicopters.^[12] ISIS attempted to stop the supplies by daily attacking the Deir ez-Zor Airbase. However, their attempts failed due to the presence of elite Republican Guards of the 104th Airborne Brigade led by Brigadier General Issam Zahreddine. In early September 2017, the SAA forces moving from al-Sukhnah reached the stronghold and joined the besieged garrison. Shortly thereafter, the siege of the city as well as the siege of the city's airport were lifted. By 3 November 2017, the SAA had fully liberated the city.</p>	
Other Points	Debris	Debris accumulation: 14,9 million tons
	Housing damage	Damaged units: 15.107 Destroyed: 4.849 Damaged units: 31.2 % Destroyed: 10 %
	Water and sanitation infrastructure	
	Power Infrastructure	No damage: Partial function: Al Teem Power Station near Deir ez Zor fully destroyed

		Electricity situation in Deir ez-Zor worsened through early 2015 and bottomed out over the course of 2016 at only 5 to 10 percent of its pre-ISIL levels of nighttime lighting.
	Transportation Infrastructure	Intracity roads- damaged: (Km-thousand) The most impacted city
	Health care facilities	9 in 10 health facilities destroyed (79%) Health facilities completely destroyed: 10% Health facilities partially destroyed: 79%
	Education facilities	5 or fewer education facilities fully damaged
	<i>Economic Activities</i>	Industrial area damage: 54% ISIL governance in controlled areas of Deir ez-Zor relied on an early partnership with former local government officials and bureaucrats, who were co-opted into maintaining critical infrastructure on behalf of the group. These initial efforts to consolidate control were bolstered by revenues from confiscation, taxation, and sales of electricity and oil resources from Deir ez-Zor governorate's vast oil reserves. However, more recent publicly available reporting suggests that ISIL was unable to provide the same quality and quantity of public services in parts of the city under its control as it did in other cities, such as Mosul and Raqqah . Analysis of satellite-derived measures of economic activity in Deir ez-Zor suggests that ISIL was ineffective at governing the neighborhoods and local economies under its control. Despite a relatively steady citywide population, market activity in ISIL-held areas remained paltry while

		<p>markets in government-held areas of the city appeared to be more active, according to crowd-sourced analysis of satellite imagery. Commercial vehicle traffic was significantly more robust in regime-held areas than in ISIL-held areas, despite the fact that ISIL controls large portions of the Deir ez-Zor countryside. The intensity of agricultural activity on the outskirts of the city appears to have declined over the course of ISIL's presence in the city, according to remote sensing-derived indicators. These data also demonstrate a dramatic fall in nighttime lighting in both ISIL-controlled areas and those controlled by government forces, indicating a surprising inability of ISIL forces to provide fuel for generators within the city despite its proximity to the vast majority of ISIL oil production. Finally, contested portions of the city also saw statistically significant reductions in population and nighttime lighting relative to those in regime-held areas. This is likely driven by significant levels of destruction in the seams between ISIL-held areas and regime-held areas, according to crowd-sourced estimates of damage in the city. This finding affirms the fact that military opposition to the Islamic State is one of the main drivers of economic stagnation within its spheres of influence</p>
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References

- SARDAR MLLA DRWISH, Deir Ezzor: An Unbalanced Equation in the Syrian Conflict, Feb 2018, SyriaSource
- Deir ez-Zor: Protracted Stalemate, RAND

HAMA		
Exposure to conflict		
Total Damage	12,92%	
Geographical representation	<p>Hama is a city on the banks of the Orontes River in west-central Syria. It is located 213 km (132 mi) north of Damascus and 46 kilometers (29 mi) north of Homs. It is the provincial capital of the Hama Governorate. With a population of 854,000 (2009 census), Hama is the fourth-largest city in Syria after Aleppo, Damascus and Homs. The city is renowned for its seventeen norias used for watering the gardens, which are locally claimed to date back to 1100 BC. Though historically used for purpose of irrigation, the norias exist today as an almost entirely aesthetic traditional show</p>	
Source/Destination IDPs	<p>From Hama : around 500.00 fled inside Syria, 218.288 fled outside Syria Returns: 61.000</p>	
Roots conflict	<p>In the sixties, political insurgency by Sunni Islamic groups, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, occurred in the city, which was reputed as a stronghold of conservative Sunni Islam. As early as the spring of 1964, Hama became the epicenter of an uprising by conservative forces, encouraged by speeches from mosque preachers, denouncing the policies of the Ba'ath. The Syrian government sent tanks and troops into the quarters of Hama's old city to put down the insurrection. In the early 1980s, Hama had emerged as a major source of opposition to the Ba'ath government during the Sunni armed Islamist uprising, which had begun in 1976. The city was a focal point for bloody events in the 1981 massacre and the most notable 1982 Hama massacre. The most serious insurrection of the Syrian Islamic uprising happened in Hama during February 1982, when Government forces, led by the president's brother, Rifaat al-Assad, quelled the revolt in Hama with very harsh means.^[30] Tanks and artillery shelled the neighborhoods held by the insurgents indiscriminately, and government forces are alleged to have executed thousands of prisoners and civilian residents after subduing the revolt, which became known as the Hama Massacre. The story is suppressed and regarded as highly sensitive in Syria. The Hama Massacre led to the military term "Hama Rules" meaning the complete large-scale destruction of a military objective or target. The city was the site of conflict between the Syrian military and opposition forces as one of the main arenas of the Syrian civil war during the 2011 siege of Hama.</p>	
Other Points	Debris	Debris accumulation:
	Housing damage	<p>Damaged units: 2.531 Destroyed: 3.020 Damaged units: 2.5%</p>

		Destroyed: 3%
	Water and sanitation infrastructure	
	Power Infrastructure	No damage: 99.24 Partial function: 99.75
	Transportation Infrastructure	Intracity roads- damaged: (Km-thousand) The most impacted city
	Health care facilities	Health facilities partially destroyed: 2%
	Education facilities	No education facilities fully destroyed
	<i>Economic Activities</i>	Industrial area damage: 2%

References

- Syria Damage Assessment of selected cities – Aleppo, Hama, Idlib, World Bank Group, 2017
- WAVE 2017
 - o Ammar Khammash, Hama, Natural –Cultural Heritage, is it about the past or the future?

HOMS		
Exposure to conflict		
Total Damage	20.5%	
Geographical representation	<p>Homs is a city in western Syria and the capital of the Homs Governorate. It is 501 meters (1,644 ft) above sea level and is located 162 kilometers (101 mi) north of Damascus.^[5]</p> <p>Located on the Orontes River, Homs is also the central link between the interior cities and the Mediterranean coast. Before the Syrian civil war, Homs was a major industrial center, and with a population of at least 652,609 people in 2004, it was the third largest city in Syria after Aleppo to the north and the capital Damascus to the south. Its population reflects Syria's general religious diversity, composed of Sunni and Alawite and Christian. There are a number of historic mosques and churches in the city, and it is close to the Krak des Chevaliers castle, a world heritage site.</p>	
Source/Destination IDPs	<p>Exodus of residents</p> <p>59% internal displacement intra-Governorate of Homs</p> <p>From Homs : around 608.00 fled inside Syria, 445,223 fled outside Syria</p>	
Roots conflict		
Other Points	Debris	Debris accumulation:
	Housing damage	Damaged units:37,350 Destroyed:12.526 Damaged units: 17,3% Destroyed: 5.8 %
	Water and sanitation infrastructure	Shortages and poor quality of water
	Power Infrastructure	No damage: No function: Alternative electricity supply – car batteries: 67,3%
	Transportation Infrastructure	Homs is considered a <u>transportation hub</u> in Syria, by virtue of its central location between the coastal cities and the interior
	Health care facilities	Health facilities completely destroyed: 6%

		Health facilities partially destroyed: 52%
	Education facilities	5 or fewer education facilities fully damaged
	<i>Economic Activities</i>	Industrial area damage: 43%

References

- Marwa Al-Sabouni, Memoir of a Syrian Architect, The Battle for home

IDLIB		
Exposure to conflict		
Total Damage	6.03%	
Geographical representation	<p>Idlib is a city in northwestern Syria, capital of the Idlib Governorate, 59 kilometers (37 mi) southwest of Aleppo. It has an elevation of nearly 500 meters (1,600 ft) above sea level. In the 2004 census by the Central Bureau of Statistics, Idlib had a population of 98,791 and in 2010 the population was around 165,000. Before the Civil War, the inhabitants were mostly Sunni Muslims, although there was a significant Christian minority. Idlib is divided into six main districts: Ashrafiyeh (the most populous), Hittin, Hejaz, Downtown, Hurriya, and al-Qusur. A major agricultural center of Syria, the Idlib area is also historically significant, containing many "dead cities" and man-made tells. Idlib contains the ancient city of Ebla, once the capital of a powerful kingdom. The ancient kingdoms of Nuhašše and Luhuti flourished in the Governorate during the Bronze and Iron ages.</p>	
Source/Destination IDPs	70% internal displacement intra-Governorate of Idlib From Idlib : around 143.00 fled inside Syria, 179.037 fled outside Syria	
Roots conflict		
Other Points	Debris	Debris accumulation:
	Housing damage	Damaged units: 1.164 Destroyed: 2.916 Damaged units : 25,3% Destroyed: 6.3%
	Water and sanitation infrastructure	
	Power Infrastructure	No damage: 94.29 No function: 4.29 Zeyzoun Power Plant in Idlib gov. fully destroyed Alternative electricity supply – car batteries: 64,8%
	Transportation Infrastructure	
	Health care facilities	8 in 10 health facilities destroyed Health facilities completely destroyed: 20%

		Health facilities partially destroyed: 60%
	Education facilities	No education facilities fully destroyed
	<i>Economic Activities</i>	Industrial area damage: 34%

References

- Syria Damage Assessment of selected cities – Aleppo, Hama, Idlib, World Bank Group, 2017

KOBANI		
Exposure to conflict	As a consequence of the Syrian Civil War, the city has been under control of the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) militia since 2012. In 2014, it was declared to be the administrative center of the Kobanî Canton of the <i>de facto</i> autonomous Rojava, which later became the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria. From September 2014 to January 2015, the city was under siege by Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Most of the city was destroyed and most of the population fled to Turkey. In 2015, many returned and reconstruction began. Prior to the Syrian Civil War, Kobanî was recorded as having a population of close to 45,000. The majority of inhabitants were Kurds, with Arab, Turkmen, and Armenian minorities. ^[4]	
Geographical representation	Kobanî is a city in the Aleppo Governorate in northern Syria, lying immediately south of the border with Turkey.	
Source/Destination IDPs		
Roots conflict		
Other Points	Debris	Debris accumulation:
	Housing damage	Damaged units:2.226 Destroyed:814 Damaged units:10.7% Destroyed: 3,9 %
	Water and sanitation infrastructure	Almost all infrastructure remained intact
	Power Infrastructure	No damage: 66.67 No function: 33.33
	Transportation Infrastructure	
	Health care facilities	Health facilities partially destroyed: 33%
	Education facilities	5 or fewer education facilities fully damaged
	Economic activities	Industrial area damage: 39%

References

- *WAVE 2017*

- o *Ricardo Carvalho, Kobane: is time a raw material?*

PALMYRA		
Exposure to conflict		
Geographical representation	<p>Palmyra is an ancient Semitic city in present-day Homs Governorate, Syria. Archaeological finds date back to the Neolithic period, and documents first mention the city in the early second millennium BC. Palmyra changed hands on a number of occasions between different empires before becoming a subject of the Roman Empire in the first century AD</p>	
Source/Destination IDPs		
Roots conflict	<p>During the Syrian Civil War in 2015, Palmyra came under the control of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and subsequently changed hands several times between the militant group and the Syrian Army who retook the city on 2 March 2017. ISIL sabotaged many artifacts and destroyed a number of buildings, considerably damaging the ancient site.</p>	
Other Points	Debris	Debris accumulation:
	Housing damage	Damaged units: 1042 Destroyed: 272 Damaged units: 32,8 % Destroyed: 8.6 %
	Water and sanitation infrastructure	New wells: more than tanks
	Power Infrastructure	No damage: 30.00 Partial function: 90.00
	Transportation Infrastructure	
	Health care facilities	Hospitals and medical centers destroyed (%)
	Education facilities	7 education facilities destroyed
	Economic activities	Industrial area damage: 43%

References

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 - Francesco Cacciatori, Palmyra: Rubble or Ruins?
 - Attilio Santi, Palmyra: what is the future for memory?
 - Roberta Albiero, Palmyra: What if open walls? A strategy for Tadmor
 - Sinan Hassan, Palmyra or Palmysyria, Palimpsest?
 - Camillo Magni- Operastudio: The Palmyra's oxymoron: how destruction can be preserved.

RAQQA		
Exposure to conflict	Mostly exposed to extensive airstrikes (more than 2000 strikes from 2011 to 2017)	
Geographical representation		
Source/Destination IDPs	62% internal displacement intra-Governorate of Ar Raqqa	
Roots conflict	<p>Raqqah was the first provincial capital captured by opposition forces from the Assad regime in early 2013, including Free Syrian Army units and the al-Qaeda-linked Jabbat al-Nusra (now Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham). Following ISIL's successful efforts to consolidate control over the city from these groups in January 2014, Raqqah then served as the capital of ISIL's global caliphate and a stronghold for ISIL leadership and governance within the Syrian portion of ISIL's territory. The group took significant strides to rule Raqqah as a traditional state would, including rebuilding damaged infrastructure, opening schools, managing hospitals, establishing law and order through a local police force, collecting taxes, and establishing a civil service. According to the RAND team's satellite-based indicators of economic activity, there is clear evidence that the group was a successful steward of Raqqah's economy for most of its tenure, with some modest strain beginning to appear in the availability of electricity and internally displaced person (IDP) outflows throughout late 2015 and early 2016. As with Mosul, this analysis predates operations to liberate Raqqah, which began in mid-2017</p>	
Other Points	Debris	Debris accumulation:
	Housing damage	<p>Damaged units:7214 Destroyed: 2418 Damaged units: 12.9 % Destroyed: 4.3 %</p> <p>2014 estimates suggest that some damage to the city did occur during ISIL's initial takeover. By February 2016, damage to Raqqah (predominantly from air strikes) is more widespread, but still largely sporadic across different clusters within the city. These instances of damage differ from levels of destruction seen in other cities in that they are primarily due to air strikes</p>

		rather than ground fighting or improvised explosive devices. They often represent damage to certain buildings or pieces of infrastructure of military importance to the Islamic State, rather than wholesale, indiscriminate damage to portions of the city's residential neighborhoods. This is not to say that such damage had no impact on Raqqah's local economy through mid-2016
	Water and sanitation infrastructure	Almost all infrastructure remained damaged
	Power Infrastructure	No damage: 94.59 Partial function: 86.49
	Transportation Infrastructure	
	Health care facilities	9 in 10 health facilities destroyed (80%)
	Education facilities	7 education facilities destroyed
	<i>Economic activities</i>	Major agricultural area suffered major damage; Industrial area damage: 4%

References

- Raqqah: Capital of the Caliphate, RAND
- WAVE 2017
 - o Giancarlo Mazzanti, Raqqa: Ludus, Play, and Cooperation as mechanisms for social re-composition